











































































































































































































































































The Meltdown of the Power Nucleus in Japanese Politics
Masahiro MATSUMURA
On January 12, the divided Japanese Diet finally enacted a legislative measure that authorised
the Fukuda administration to restart replenishment support for the US-led maritime interdiction
operation in the Indian Ocean. Earlier, in the Upper House, the leading opposition Democratic
Party of Japan (DPJ) and other mini-parties together voted down the already passed House bill
with a simple majority. Subsequently, in the Lower House, the ruling coalition of the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) and the Komei Party resorted to their two-third majority to override the
Upper House decision.
During the impasse of five and a half months since then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s crushing
defeat in the July 2007 Upper House election, the issue of replenishment support continued to
represent the major focal point of the political power struggle in Tokyo. This prolonged impasse
revealed that the battle between both the LDP and the DPJ was devoid of any ideological divide‚
a state of affairs that did not sharpen the national debate at all. Worse, it also suggested that nei-
ther party had more than a handful of competent next-generation leaders to constitute an effective
power nucleus in decade to come.
Accustomed to a one-party-dominated system over several decades, both LDP and DPJ leaders
are afraid of legislative stalemates and popular distrust of their respective parties. As the result,
the confrontation between both parties has continued. LDP leaders are reluctant to accelerate and
intensify the current partisan strife, even though doing so would vindicate their policy positions
and thereby benefit them in the coming national election. Further, the LDP leadership is not
ready to take a full advantage of the Constitutional rules for steering the Diet, while the DPJ
counterparts remain opportunistic.
Although the Japanese public remains highly skeptical of the inexperienced DPJ that has been
incapable to present effective policy alternatives, the LDP under Fukuda is drifting because the
Prime Minister is only an excellent manager, but neither an innovator nor a risk-taker who is able
to carry out a systemic overhaul, ranging from a resolution to the hung Diet, to the attainment of
political leadership over bureaucrats, and to policy innovations on issues that various policy
strategists have already proposed.
The current Japan’s current political stasis awaits a big bang that will bring competent next-
generation leaders into the power nucleus. This is unlikely to be expected from the existing par-
ties, but possibly feasible either through a reformed LDP or an evolved DPJ, or even a new party
to be born out of a reorganization of the two parties along ideological lines. The good news is that
we already know the prescription for a more proactive and prosperous Japan. The bad news is that
time is running out when rapidly changing international security and economic conditions require
Japan to respond promptly and offer visionary leadership.
